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Abstract 
In Germany, R&D subsidies are an important tool to support innovation in the private sector. 
This paper studies the welfare effects of R&D subsidies distributed through the German federal 
government’s thematic R&D programs between 1994 and 2011. The analysis is based on a 
structural model of the R&D subsidy process which allows to estimate the benefits of R&D 
subsides to the German economy. The model takes into account heterogeneous application costs 
of firms and identifies the effect of the subsidy on the federal government’s utility as well as 
on firm profits. 
Assuming a welfare-maximizing federal government, the estimated average social rate of return 
is 34% for Germany in the period 1994 to 2011. Thereby effects on firm profits are similar to 
effects on spillovers to the rest of the German economy. Besides results show that the subsidy 
rate decision in Germany remained remarkably stable over time, and that application costs as 
well as the marginal profitability of subsidized R&D projects are lower after the year 2000 
compared to the years before.  
 
 
JEL-Classification: D61, H25, L59, O31, O38 
Keywords: R&D, Innovation, R&D Subsidies, Innovation Policy, Welfare Economics 
 
 
 
Contact details 
Mila Koehler 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Department of Economics of Innovation and 
Industrial Dynamics, L7, 1, 68161 Mannheim, Germany 
Phone: +49-621-1235-283, email: mila.koehler@zew.de 
                                                 
1 I owe special thanks to Otto Toivanen for his helpful comments and discussions throughout this work. Great 
thanks goes also to Dirk Czarnitzki, Reinhilde Veugelers, Pierre Mohnen, Georg Licht and the SIMPATIC network 
and audience (FP7/2007-2013 - grant agreement no. 290597) for helpful discussions, as well as to the Flemish 
Science Foundation who financially supported this research project with its PhD scholarship. The views expressed 
in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author. 
1 
 
 Introduction 
Given the well-known market failures associated with R&D (Arrow 1962), governments seek 
to increase firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. First, companies cannot appropriate all returns 
from their initial R&D investments as knowledge generated in R&D activities will spill over to 
rivals. Second, firms may suffer from financial constraints for R&D projects due to asymmetric 
information between the company and external investors such as banks. There is high 
uncertainty about the expected returns of R&D activities and unlike investment in physical 
capital, R&D expenses are immediately sunk as the largest fraction of R&D is wages for R&D 
employees. Therefore, industrialized countries typically grant intellectual property rights and 
subsidize R&D in the business sector in order to alleviate market failure associated with R&D. 
Despite numerous studies (see Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014) it is still not well understood how 
R&D subsidies perform and whether the social gains exceed social costs when providing state 
aid to an industrial R&D project. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the evaluation of the effect of R&D subsidies 
by estimating the benefits of R&D subsidies for Germany. The analysis is based on a structural 
model of the R&D subsidy process designed by Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2013a). 
Germany is an especially interesting case to study because it is Europe’s biggest and one of its 
most innovative economies (OECD 2011, BMBF 2012, EC 2013)2 and Europe’s biggest 
spender of public R&D3. In addition, R&D subsidies are an important policy tool to support 
industrial R&D in Germany (BMBF 2012). There are no R&D tax credits in place like in some 
other European countries as e.g. the Netherlands, Spain or the UK. This study also profits from 
the rich data available for Germany, which allows studying the benefits of thematic R&D 
subsidies between 1994 and 2011.  
Assuming that the German federal government behaves as a benevolent social planner, results 
show that one euro of R&D subsidies from thematic R&D programs yields on average a social 
return of 1.34 euros to the German economy. Thereby R&D subsidies affect estimated firm 
profits and spillovers4 to the rest of the German economy to the same extent. When studying 
changes over time, the analysis reveals that the subsidy rate decision remained very constant 
over time. In contrast, firms’ application costs as well as the marginal profitability of subsidized 
projects were higher in the years 1994 to 2000 than in the years 2001 to 2011. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature on R&D subsidies 
for Germany. The theoretical model of the R&D subsidy process is described in section 3 and 
complemented with an overview about the innovation policy in Germany in section 4. Section 
5 presents the data and descriptive statistics while section 6 discusses the econometric 
implementation of the theory model. Estimation results are presented in section 7, effects of the 
subsidy on welfare in Germany in section 8. Section 9 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Germany has received the highest score on the average quality of patents filed a the European Patent Office 
between 2000 and 2010 (OECD 2011, p.6) and filed in the years 2000 till 2009 much more patents per millions of 
inhabitants which are relevant for the world market, i.e. filed at the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), when compared to the US, Japan and EU-27 (BMBF 2012, p.394ff). According to the Innovation Union 
Scoreboard, Germany belongs to Europe’s innovation leaders amongst other countries such as Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark (EC 2013). 
3 See the government intramural expenditure on R&D (GOVERD) of the OECD main science and technology 
indicators database on http://www.oecd.org/sti/msti.htm, accessed on December 22, 2017. 
4 Note that the term “spillovers” contains not only knowledge or technology spillovers to other firms but also how 
consumer surplus is affected. In other words spillovers are all the good and bad things from an innovation project 
that flow to the German economy and are not reflected in the profits of the firm that conducts the innovation project. 
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 Previous literature 
Existing research that evaluates the effect of R&D subsidies usually analyses input and output 
additionalities of R&D subsidies (compare the overview of R&D subsidies studies of Zúñiga-
Vicente et al. 2014). As Czarnitzki et al. (2015) demonstrate in their cross-country study 
comparing the R&D subsidy systems of Germany, Finland, Spain, The Netherlands, and 
Belgium, the process of granting R&D subsidies differs considerably between countries. 
Therefore the following review focuses on results of R&D evaluation studies for Germany. 
Input additionality studies for Germany find that firms that receive R&D subsidies invest more 
into R&D when compared to the situation of not receiving R&D subsidies (Czarnitzki and Fier 
2002, Almus and Czarnitzki 2003, Czarnitzki and Licht 2006, Aerts and Schmidt 2006, 
Hussinger 2008, Aschhoff 2009, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014, Hud and Hussinger 2015, 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2017).5 Hence, public support of industrial R&D projects in Germany 
does not fully crowd out private R&D investments. Output additionality studies for Germany 
find that publicly and privately induced R&D have a similar output productivity in terms of the 
probability to file a patent, the number of patents filed, and the sales share with new products 
(Czarnitzki and Licht 2006, Aschhoff 2009, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014, Czarnitzki and 
Hussinger 2017). While these studies demonstrate that R&D subsidies increase the innovative 
activity and innovation outcomes in Germany, the overall costs and benefits of distributing 
R&D subsidies to the private sector are unknown.  
This study contributes to the existing literature on the evaluation of the effects of R&D subsidies 
by estimating the benefits of R&D subsidies based on a structural model of the R&D subsidies 
developed by Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2013a). The model of the R&D subsidy process 
allows estimating the increase in firms’ profits due to the subsidy, the effect of the subsidy on 
the Finnish funding agency’s utility, as well as firms’ application costs. This enables calculating 
the social rate of return of the R&D subsidy. The model was originally estimated for a sample 
of Finnish firms in the period 2000 to 2002. Assuming that the Finnish funding agency behaves 
welfare maximizing, the authors find a positive social rate of return of R&D subsidies of 1.51 
euro per euro of R&D subsidy for Finland and that R&D subsidies in Finland affect firm profits 
to a larger extend than they increase spillovers to the rest of the Finnish economy.  
 The model of the R&D subsidy process 
This section provides a brief overview of the structural model of the R&D subsidy process of 
Takalo et al. (2013a).6 The model, of course, abstracts the real world features of the funding 
process, but captures its most important ones. The model of the R&D subsidy process consists 
of three stages. The first stage is the decision of the firm to apply for a subsidy with project 𝑖𝑖. 
The second stage is the decision of the funding agency on how much to support a project, which 
is measured by the subsidy rate 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. The third stage is the decision of the firm on how much to 
invest into an R&D project (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖) given the subsidy rate the project receives.  
The model assumes that there are no fixed costs of R&D and that firms are not financially 
constrained when making their R&D decision. Firms do not misuse the subsidy amount 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 
and conduct only one project at a time. Hence, the subscript 𝑖𝑖 denotes project and firm 
interchangeably. There is incomplete information between the firms and the funding agency 
                                                 
5 Studies from Hussinger (2008), Aschoff (2009), Hud and Hussinger (2015) and Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2017) 
are also based on evaluating data from R&D subsidies of thematic R&D programs in Germany. 
6 For further details on the model and statistical assumptions the interested reader is referred to Takalo et al. 
(2013a). 
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due to 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, a random shock to the spillover rate of project 𝑖𝑖, which is known by the agency but 
unknown by the firm. So the firm does not know how the agency will evaluate the R&D project 
and therefore does not know if and to which extent the agency will subsidize the R&D project. 
Due to incomplete information a firm may decide to invest into submitting a costly application, 
but is denied a subsidy. There is also random shocks to the profitability and application costs 
of project 𝑖𝑖. All random shocks are drawn from common knowledge distributions. The model 
is solved by backward induction. 
Stage 3 - the R&D investment decision. Let us first consider the third stage, i.e. the R&D 
investment decision. Firms are profit maximizers. Their profit function for project 𝑖𝑖 is specified 
as 
(1) Π(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observable firm characteristics, 𝛽𝛽 a vector of parameters to be estimated, 
and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 the random shock to the marginal profitability of project 𝑖𝑖. As equation (1) shows, R&D 
investments have decreasing returns to scale, because the relationship between R&D and profits 
is logarithmic. Firms maximize their profits by setting the optimal R&D investment 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. The 
first order condition yields 
(2) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽+𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)1−𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 . 
From equation (2) it follows that the optimal R&D investment for project 𝑖𝑖 increases with the 
subsidy rate.  
Stage 2 - the subsidy decision. If the firm applies for a subsidy, the second stage is the funding 
decision. In Germany the funding decision is incumbent on the Federal Ministries. The federal 
government is assumed to maximize the social welfare of the economy, i.e. consumer and 
producer surplus. Its expected utility from project 𝑖𝑖 is given by 
(3) 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑉𝑉(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖),𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) + Π(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖), 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) − 𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖) − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖. 
The federal government’s utility of project 𝑖𝑖 increases with increasing expected spillovers 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 
and expected firm profits 𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖 from project 𝑖𝑖. It decreases in the opportunity costs of funding (𝑔𝑔) 
like costs of taxation, and the fix costs 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖. 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 consists out of the firm’s application costs and the 
federal government’s costs of screening project 𝑖𝑖. Spillovers 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 depend on the level of R&D 
investment 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖), 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 a vector of observable firm characteristics affecting the spillover rate of 
a project, and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 the shock to the spillover rate of project 𝑖𝑖. Note that in the context of this model 
the term spillovers captures all externalities of project 𝑖𝑖 to the economy that are not captured by 
the firm’s profits from project 𝑖𝑖. In other words, the spillovers of project 𝑖𝑖 are all the good and 
bad things that flow to a nation’s economy, which are not appropriated by the R&D conducting 
firm itself but affect consumer or producer surplus. 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 can also include idiosyncratic benefits of 
the federal government that may for example have the incentive to give maximum subsidy rates 
in order to administer fewer projects at the same time or reflect personal benefits of the federal 
government from bribing.  
The federal government maximizes its utility from project 𝑖𝑖 by setting the optimal subsidy rate 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖. The spillovers of an R&D project are defined as 
(4) 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖)𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖. 
Hence, the spillover rate per euro of R&D is 
(5) 𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖
= 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖. 
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The spillover rate per euro of R&D depends on a vector of observable firm characteristics 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,7 
𝛿𝛿 a vector of parameters to be estimated, and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 a random shock to the spillover rate from 
project 𝑖𝑖. 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is unobserved by the firm when applying, but known by the federal government. 
This implies that the applicant firm does not know exactly how the federal government will rate 
the spillovers of project 𝑖𝑖 to the economy or how the project affects the benefits of the federal 
government. Maximizing the federal government’s utility from project 𝑖𝑖 taking account of 
equations (2) and (5) and using the envelope theorem yields 
(6) 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑔𝑔 + 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖  . 
The optimal subsidy rate depends negatively on the opportunity costs of funding g, and 
positively on the spillover rate per euro of R&D and the shock to the spillover rate 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖. The 
subsidy rate has an upper and a lower bound. It may be zero in case a project is rejected and 
capped at a maximum subsidy rate (?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖). EU guidelines foresee that public funding of private 
R&D activities should not cover more than 50% of project costs (EC 1986, EC 1996, EC 2006). 
There are exemptions for SMEs, R&D collaborations, and firms located in economically 
disadvantaged regions like eastern Germany. Therefore the maximum subsidy varies depending 
on firm and project characteristics. The minimum constraint 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 binds for 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜂𝜂 ≡ 𝑔𝑔 − 1 −
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿, while the maximum constraint 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖 binds for 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝜂𝜂 ≡ ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑔𝑔 − 1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿. 
Stage 1 – the application decision. The first stage depicts the firm’s decision whether or not 
to apply for a subsidy. A firm will apply for a subsidy, if its expected profits from applying 
minus its application costs 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 exceed the expected profits from not applying. The expected 
profits from applying depend on the firm’s belief of how the federal government will rate its 
project. 𝜙𝜙(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) denotes firm 𝑖𝑖’s beliefs about 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 and Φ(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) the corresponding cumulative 
distribution function. Dropping the subscript 𝑖𝑖, the application decision rule can be written as 
(7)  𝑑𝑑 = 1 �Φ �𝜂𝜂�Π(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(0), 0) + ∫ Π�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅�𝑠𝑠(𝜂𝜂)�, 𝑠𝑠(𝜂𝜂)�𝜙𝜙(𝜂𝜂)𝑑𝑑𝜂𝜂 +𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂[1 −Φ(𝜂𝜂)]Π(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠), 𝑠𝑠) − 𝐾𝐾 ≥ Π(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(0), 0) �, 
where 𝑑𝑑 takes value one if a firm applies for a subsidy and zero otherwise. The expected profit 
from applying in equation (7) consists of three parts. The first part in the curly brackets denotes 
the belief of the firm how likely it will receive no funding for project 𝑖𝑖, Φ(𝜂𝜂) times the profit 
given no subsidy, i.e. 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 𝛱𝛱𝑖𝑖(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(0),0). The second term in the curly brackets denotes 
a firm’s belief of receiving a subsidy rate for project 𝑖𝑖 that is not censored at zero or the 
maximum subsidy rate times the profits from receiving that specific subsidy rate. This can be 
calculated by integrating the expected profits over the random spillover shock for project 𝑖𝑖 
under the area 𝜂𝜂 < 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 < 𝜂𝜂, which corresponds to 0 < 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 < ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖. The third term in the curly 
brackets is the probability that project 𝑖𝑖 receives the maximum subsidy rate, which is (1 −
Φ(?̅?𝜂𝑖𝑖)), times the profits from receiving ?̅?𝑠. 
The expected profits from applying for the subsidy are reduced by the application costs. The 
application costs are specified as  
(8) 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖). 
The application costs for project 𝑖𝑖 depend on a vector of observed firm characteristics 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖, a 
vector of parameters to be estimated 𝜃𝜃, and a random cost shock 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 which is observed by the 
firm and the federal government but not by the econometrician. 
                                                 
7 Note that 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observable firm characteristics affecting the spillover rate per euro of R&D of project 
𝑖𝑖, while 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of observable firm characteristics affecting the profitability and application cost of R&D of 
project 𝑖𝑖. 
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 Innovation policy in Germany 
R&D subsidies. In Germany R&D subsidies for project funding are an important policy tool 
to support industrial R&D (BMBF 2012). In contrast to most other OECD countries, there are 
no R&D tax credits in place. R&D subsidies to firms are granted either via thematic or generic 
R&D programs (BMBF 2012). With the thematic R&D programs the federal government aims 
at increasing Germany’s competitiveness by targeting R&D subsidies to R&D projects in 
technological areas that the federal government views as particularly important for the future 
technological competitiveness of Germany (BMBF 2012).8 The generic R&D programs are not 
directed to specific technological areas and allow supporting e.g. R&D infrastructure 
investments, technology transfer, and innovation networks (BMBF 2012). They are targeted to 
support especially SMEs and firms in eastern Germany. Bank loans, equity investments, and 
guarantees also exist but play a minor role in Germany. 
The federal ministries – mainly the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and 
the Federal Ministry for Economics and Technology (BMWi) – design the R&D programs, i.e. 
they decide program content, duration of the support, subsidy requirements, and the maximum 
subsidy amounts distributed to an R&D project. Firms, universities, and research institutions 
can apply to receive government funding under a specific R&D program. Usually, the federal 
ministries pass on the administrative and scientific-technical work to the Program Management 
Agencies that have the scientific and technical expertise to administer and guide the R&D 
program. In Germany there are currently 14 Program Management Agencies (BMBF 2013). 
The Program Management Agencies “are commissioned to advise applicants, prepare funding 
decisions, process the projects and monitor their success” (BMBF 2010, p.24). The final 
subsidy decision is however incumbent on the Federal Ministries.  
Application and granting procedure. There are one- and two-step application and granting 
procedures for R&D subsidies in Germany. In the one-step procedure the applicants hand in 
their final project application, which the federal ministry will then accept or reject. In the two-
step procedure firms only hand in a short concept paper of their R&D project in the first step. 
If the concept paper gets accepted, a full application is handed in in a second step. The two-step 
procedure is used to reduce the administrative burden for applicants as well as the agencies and 
speed up the application process. The two-step procedure is especially used for R&D programs 
directed at SMEs. While the two-step procedure reduces the administrative burden for those 
firms rejected at the first stage, it remains the same for enterprises that have to file a full 
application (Aschhoff et al. 2012). 
For the purpose of the theory model it is assumed for simplicity that there is only a one-step 
application procedure in place as modelled by Takalo et al. (2013a) for Finland. Three reasons 
justify this simplification. First, the two-step procedure is only in place for some but not all 
R&D programs. Second, full application costs for the two-step procedure do not differ from 
those of the one-step procedure. Third, application costs are found to be of only minor 
importance for Finnish firms by Takalo et al. (2013a). 
The exact selection criteria vary from program to program. General selection criteria are: The 
project fits into the thematic outline of the R&D program; the relevance of the research goal 
and the quality of the R&D project; the know-how and expertise of the applicant (and its 
                                                 
8 Technological areas, in which the German federal government intends to achieve or maintain high international 
standards of R&D, comprise among others: basic research, marine and polar research, space research, energy 
research, ecological and sustainable development research, health and medicine, biotechnology, material, physical 
and chemical research, aerospace research, R&D in agriculture, forestry and farming. Thereby these technological 
fields are covered by different programs in a given year. This is also reflected in the institutional structure, as there 
are 14 Program Management Agencies which are specialized in different technological fields. 
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partners); the economic and technical potential and risk; the possible economic utilization of 
the innovation; and if the project is a cooperation or not (Fier 2002, Aschhoff et al. 2012). 
Besides, the financial solvency of the firm is very important, as the federal government wants 
to avoid writing off R&D projects because grant receivers are unable to meet financial 
obligations (Aschhoff et al. 2012). Therefore firms have to prove their ability to pay their share 
of the project costs. The credit screening will be done with special care for firms that apply for 
the first time.9  
Subsidy rate. Germany applies the Community Framework for State Aid for R&D (EC 1986, 
EC 1996, EC 2006). Hence, industrial research usually gets a maximum subsidy rate of 50% 
i.e. the share of public funding may cover at maximum half of the total project costs. There are 
a few possibilities though to receive a bonus on top of the maximum subsidy rate of 50%. Some 
bonuses have also been changing over time between the Community Frameworks for State Aid 
for R&D from 1986, 1996 and 2006. A bonus may be paid in the following cases: 
• SMEs may receive an additional rate of 10%, as it is assumed that they face greater 
financial constraints and are thus more eligible to receive state aid. From 2007 on 
small enterprises can even receive a bonus of 20%. 
• Economically disadvantaged regions like eastern Germany can get a bonus of 10%. 
• Collaborative projects could receive a bonus of 10% from 1997 on and a bonus of 
15% from 2007, as it is assumed that collaboration induces higher spillovers.  
There is, however, also an absolute maximum subsidy rate. According to the Community 
framework from 1996 (EC 1996) a subsidy to the private sector should not exceed 75% and 
according to the Community framework from 2006 (EC 2006) not exceed 80%. In the 
Community framework from 1986 it is only mentioned that the subsidy rate should not be so 
high that it diminishes the commitment of the firm to the project (EC 1986). 
 Data and descriptive statistics 
5.1 Data 
The granting behaviour for R&D subsidies of the federal government in Germany is analysed 
using the PROFI database from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The PROFI 
database contains project-level information on R&D subsidies from thematic R&D programs 
since 1969. The data does not contain information about generic R&D subsidy programs.10 
Besides, the PROFI database contains only successful applications, but no rejected applications, 
a fact accounted for in the empirical analysis. In case a firm got granted more than one 
application per year, only the first application filed is used in the subsequent analysis (see also 
Takalo et al. 2013a). 
The sample of firms that could potentially apply for a thematic R&D program stems from the 
Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) of the Centre of European Economic Research (ZEW).11 
The MIP is conducted annually since 1993. The data is representative for German firms with at 
                                                 
9 Note that Takalo et al. (2013a) estimate the structural model for Finland, where the funding agency rates projects 
on a scale of 1 to 5 on two dimensions: economic and technological risk. In contrast to Finland, a systematic 
grading system of R&D projects is not used in Germany. 
10 Hence, the analysis in this paper does not reflect effects of generic R&D programs which are mainly targeted to 
SMEs and firms located in eastern Germany. 
11 General information on the MIP can be found under http://www.zew.de/en/forschung/mannheim-innovation-
panel-innovation-activities-of-german-enterprises/?cHash=2f5ad528d970811ef72a75fc0a186a0c. 
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least 5 employees in the production sector as well as for a number of service sectors (Rammer 
2012).12 Most firm characteristics such as the number of employees, sales per employee, if a 
firm is an SME, exporter or part of a company group, regional and industry dummies come 
from the MIP data. Firm age and regional dummies are used from the Creditreform database. 
The Creditreform database is the biggest database on German companies. It contains the 
information of firms’ credit reports (Creditreform 2013). 
As I analyse the effect of R&D subsidies from thematic R&D programs that are targeted to 
support R&D in specific technological fields, industries where firms generally do not apply for 
thematic R&D subsidies are excluded from the sample. These are manufacturing of tobacco 
products, sale, wholesale and retail trade, real estate activities, and renting (see Table 9 in the 
Appendix for a list of the industries contained in the sample). When the project-level subsidy 
data (PROFI) is combined with the firm-level data (MIP and Creditreform), the firm-level data 
is lagged by one or two years in order to avoid direct simultaneity. If firm characteristics from 
the previous period were not observed, the firm characteristics are lagged by two years. The 
application information from the PROFI dataset in 1994 to 2011 is matched to the MIP data for 
the years 1992 to 2010. For 2,320 observations that stem from 1,395 firms the R&D subsidy 
information can be linked to the one- or two-year lagged firm characteristics of the MIP.13 The 
final sample of potential applicants comprises 90,999 observations between 1994 and 2011 that 
stem from 20,976 firms. The random sample of firms between 1994 and 2011 is treated as a 
pooled cross-section. 
The 90,999 firm-year observations are used to estimate the firms’ application decision. The 
2,320 observed R&D projects in the data are used to estimate the subsidy decision by the 
German federal government as well as the project-level R&D investment decision of the firm. 
In case a firm received a subsidy, the amount of the project-level subsidy, the total size of the 
R&D project and the project’s subsidy rate, i.e. the share of public funding on the total project 
costs, is observed. 
5.2 Variables 
The variable SUBSRATE is defined as the subsidy amount on total project costs granted to 
successful applicants. The dummy variable ACCEPTED takes value one if a firm got an R&D 
subsidy for a project application, and zero otherwise. If the firm received a subsidy, the size of 
the subsidized project level R&D is observed. Project level R&D (RD) is measured in euros 
and deflated with base year 2000.14 To avoid results being driven by outliers, the top one percent 
of the largest R&D projects is dropped from the sample.  
The following firm characteristics are employed in the subsidy rate decision, application rate 
decision and R&D investment decision. The log of firm age (LNAGE) and its square 
(LNAGE2) account for differences between young and old firms. The log of employment 
                                                 
12 The survey is representative for the production sector (mining, manufacturing, energy and water supply) as well 
as for a number of service sectors (wholesale trade, transport/postal services, media services, computer services 
and telecommunications, financial services, consulting/marketing, technical and R&D services, other firm-related 
services) (Rammer 2012). Each year about 6,000 firms participate in the written or online survey. Since 
participation in the survey is voluntary about 4,500 firms are asked via telephone to avoid biased survey results. 
The MIP is structured as a panel, i.e. questionnaires are sent each year to the same sample of firms. Every second 
year the sample is extended by a random sample of newly funded firms to replace firms that dropped out of the 
sample e.g. because they are closed down. 
13 For 2,146 observations the firm information is lagged by one year and only for 174 observations lagged by two 
years.  
14 RD is deflated with a sector-specific deflator of the gross value added provided by the Federal Statistical Office 
in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, Destatis-Genesis, Bruttowertschöpfung nach Branche, data retrieved 18th 
December 2012). 
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(LNEMP) and its square (LNEMP2) account for differences in firm size. Very large firms that 
indicate to employ more than 50,000 employees are dropped from the sample to avoid outliers 
determining the results. This accounts for less than 0.1% of firms in the sample. Sales per 
employee (SALESEMP) and its square (SALESEMP2) are included to account for differences 
in labour productivity. SALESEMP is measured in million euros and deflated using the year 
2000 as the base year. To avoid outliers the top one percent of SALESEMP is dropped from 
the sample. 
EXPORTER is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm exports and zero else. GROUP 
is a dummy that takes value one if the firm is part of a group and zero otherwise. It is important 
to account for past funding experiences since there are learning effects in applying for funding. 
Aschhoff (2010) finds path dependency of receiving thematic R&D funding in Germany based 
on a sample of over 6,000 firms from the manufacturing and service industries in the period 
1994 to 2005. Information about past project funding contained in the PROFI database allows 
to create the dummy variable PREVAPPL which takes value one if the company has received 
any funding within a thematic R&D program in the past and zero else. The variable 
LNPASTPROJ contains the log of the number of funded projects a firm received in the past.15 
The SME dummy takes value one, if a company is a small and medium enterprise and zero 
otherwise. The SME status is only contained in the application and subsidy rate decision and 
serves as exclusion restriction in the R&D investment equation. The SME status affects the 
maximum subsidy rate and hence the probability of a firm to apply for a subsidy, while it does 
not affect the profitability of R&D. 
In addition, ten different regional dummies (REG1-REG10) control for differences between 
regions in Germany (see Table 8 in the Appendix). Thereby three regions (REG8, REG9, and 
REG10) are regions in eastern Germany. Twelve sector dummies account for differences across 
industries (N1-N12, see Table 9 in the Appendix), and 18 year dummies account for changes 
in the subsidy rate decision, application decision and R&D investment decision over time 
(YEAR1994-YEAR2011). 
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the total sample differentiated by subsidy status.16 
The group of non-subsidy receivers consists mainly out of non-applicants, but contains also 
rejected applicants because rejections cannot be identified in the subsidy data available. The 
average subsidy rate granted to an R&D project of a firm between 1994 and 2011 in the sample 
is 48%. The minimum subsidy rate in the data is 10%, while the maximum subsidy rate is 80%. 
The median firm receives a subsidy of 50% which corresponds to the maximum subsidy rate to 
industrial research according to EU guidelines (see Section 4). Higher subsidy rates may be 
granted to collaborative R&D projects, SMEs and firms located in eastern Germany. The 
distribution of the subsidy rate depicted in Figure 1 demonstrates that the subsidy rate is centred 
around 50% and peaks at the even numbers of 30%, 40%, 50%, 60% and 70%.  
The size of a publicly funded thematic R&D project in Germany is 366,000 euros for the median 
firm and 620,000 euros on average. The share of firms in the sample that received project 
funding is 2.6%. The share of SMEs is with 60% significantly lower among the subsidy 
receivers when compared to the non-subsidy receivers of which 80% are SMEs. Accordingly, 
firms that receive public R&D funding are significantly larger in terms of the number of 
                                                 
15 As many companies did not receive funding for previous R&D projects, I take the logarithm of the number of 
funded projects in the past plus one, so that the logarithm of the number of funded projects a firm received in the 
past (LNPASTPROJ) will be zero, if a firm did not receive funding in the past. 
16 Descriptive statistics of regional, industry and year dummies are displayed in Table 10 in the Appendix. 
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employees (on average 1,295 employees compared to 300 employees). They are also more often 
part of a group (47% compared to 33%) and export more often.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables   Subsidy receivers   Non-subsidy receivers   t-test 
   med. mean s.d. min. max.  med. mean s.d. min. max.    
SUBSRATE  0.50 0.48 0.09 0.10 0.80         
RDa  365.7 619.9 749.9 0.7 6,072.0         
SME  1 0.60 0.49 0 1  1 0.80 0.40 0 1  *** 
AGE  14 29 37 1 359  17 30 37 1 680   
EMP  110 1,295 4,034 1 42,289  45 300 1,519 1 48,000  *** 
SALESEMP  0.11 0.15 0.15 0.00 2.50  0.10 0.14 0.17 0 2.62  *** 
GROUP  0 0.47 0.50 0 1  0 0.33 0.47 0 1  *** 
EXPORTER  1 0.83 0.38 0 1  1 0.60 0.49 0 1  *** 
PREVAPPL  1 0.63 0.48 0 1  0 0.09 0.28 0 1  *** 
PASTPROJ  1 4.01 9.81 0 112  0 0.18 1.09 0 79  *** 
No. of obs.  2,320  88,679   
Note: a Values are presented in thousand euros. Columns with heading med. display the median values, 
s.d. the standard deviation, min. minimum values and max. maximum values. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. Descriptive statistics of regional, industry and year dummies are displayed in Table 10 in 
the Appendix. 
Figure 1: Subsidy rate for industrial R&D projects between 1994 and 2011 
 
Note: Kernel density of the distribution of the subsidy rate for those 2,320 firms that received a subsidy. 
The subsidy rate is the share of public funding on total project cost. 
There is a small but significant difference in terms of labour productivity (SALESEMP) which 
is slightly higher for subsidized firms. The average age of firms is 30 in the sample and similar 
for subsidy and non-subsidy receivers. The descriptive statistics reveal path dependency in 
public R&D funding. 63% of subsidy receivers already received thematic R&D funding in the 
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past when compared to only 9% of the non-subsidy receivers. Accordingly, current subsidy 
receivers have on average received subsidies for 4 projects in the past, while the non-subsidy 
receivers conducted on average only 0.2 projects in the past. 
Regarding sectoral differences it shows that the largest share of subsidy receivers stems from 
the R&D, architecture and engineers industry (N11) with 16%. This is followed by the 
machinery and equipment industry (N3) with 14%, the medical, precision and optical 
instruments industry (N6) with also 14%, and the radio, television, and communication 
equipment industry (N5) with 7% (see Table 10 in the Appendix). 
 Econometric implementation 
This section describes how the theoretical model illustrated in section 3 can be estimated. The 
econometric implementation of the theory model presented in section 3 follows the structural 
model of the R&D subsidy process presented by Takalo et al. (2013a). The model of Takalo et 
al. (2013a) is tailored to the data of the Finnish funding agency Tekes. In contrast, the empirical 
model presented in the following is tailored to the German subsidy data available through the 
PROFI database. Recall that in contrast to the Finnish data from Tekes, the PROFI database 
does not contain information on rejected applications, i.e. the case that the subsidy rate 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 0 
is not observed. Therefore the estimation of the application decision and the subsidy decision 
in Germany are adjusted to account for not observing rejected applications. In addition, the 
Finnish data contains the rating of R&D projects regarding their technological and economic 
risk by the Finnish funding agency Tekes, which is not the case for Germany. The econometric 
implementation described in the following aims to be as concise as possible.17  
The theoretical model presented in section 3 yields equations of the federal government’s 
subsidy rate decision and the firms’ application and R&D investment decision. The game 
theoretic model starts with the application decision of firms, followed by the federal 
government’s decision on the optimal subsidy rate, while on the last stage the firm makes the 
optimal R&D investment decision. In contrast to theoretical model, in the empirical 
implementation the subsidy rate decision is estimated first, followed by the application decision 
and the R&D investment decision of the firm. The reason is that a firm’s application decision 
depends upon the firm’s belief of how applying will affect its profits, which is estimated using 
information from the federal government’s subsidy rate decision. 
The subsidy rate decision. As a first step, the subsidy rate of project 𝑖𝑖 is estimated using a left-
truncated and right-censored Tobit model. The data is left-truncated at zero because rejected 
applicants are not observed, and it is right-censored at the maximum subsidy rate (?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖). The 
maximum subsidy rate may vary between 50 and 80% depending on a firm’s SME status, 
location in eastern or western Germany and if the subsidized project involves an R&D 
collaboration (see Section 4). As equation (6) demonstrates, the optimal subsidy rate 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖∗ can be 
estimated by 
(9) 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖∗ = 1 − 𝑔𝑔 + 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖. 
To account for left-truncation in a right-censored regression model, the partial likelihood is 
conditioned on the fact that an observation is in the sample, i.e. an application is successful 
conditional on applying (𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴). Assuming a normal distribution 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴 can be described by 
                                                 
17 For a more extensive description of the econometric implementation, statistical assumptions and implications of 
the model of the R&D subsidy process the interested reader is referred to Takalo et al. (2013a). 
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(10) 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴 = 1 −Φ�0−(1−𝑔𝑔+𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿)𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂 � = Φ�1−𝑔𝑔+𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂 �. 
The left-truncated and right-censored likelihood function assuming a normal distribution is 
given by equation (11), where 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 is one in case a project receives the maximum subsidy rate, 
and zero otherwise. 
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The estimation of the subsidy rate allows the identification of the spillover parameters 𝛿𝛿 as well 
as the variance of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 the spillover shock to project 𝑖𝑖. The parameter vector 𝛿𝛿 measures how the 
German federal government values each euro of R&D invested in project 𝑖𝑖 and allows the 
calculation of the expected increase in the federal government’s utility by project 𝑖𝑖 that is not 
captured by the firm’s profits from project 𝑖𝑖. Multiplying the spillover rate per euro of R&D 
from equation (5) with the amount of project-level R&D investment 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 yields a measure of 
the spillovers of project i 
(12) 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 , 
where Yi is a vector of observable firm characteristics affecting a projects’ spillover rate. 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  
captures the spillovers of project 𝑖𝑖 to the German economy under the assumption that the 
German federal government acts as a benevolent planner and maximizes social welfare by 
setting the optimal subsidy rate for project 𝑖𝑖. The estimation of the subsidy rate does not allow 
the identification of the opportunity costs of funding (𝑔𝑔) and the federal government’s screening 
costs (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 − 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖, where 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 are firm i’s application costs). The estimation of the impact of project 
𝑖𝑖 on welfare will be upward biased, in case the screening costs are significant. The subsidy rate 
decision is estimated based upon 2,320 observations. 
Application decision. The available data only contains grant receivers of thematic R&D 
programs, no rejections. To account for this fact the empirical model used in this paper is 
adjusted and hence differs from the empirical model presented by Takalo et al. (2013a). 
Findings on the application behaviour of successful applicants to all potential applicants in 
Germany can be generalized by the following method. 
The probability of firm 𝑖𝑖 to successfully apply for an R&D subsidy (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) equals the 
probability to apply for a subsidy (𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴) times the probability to receive a subsidy conditional on 
applying (𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴). 
(13) 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎  =  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 ∗  𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴 
The probability of firm 𝑖𝑖 to receive a subsidy conditional on applying (𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴) is estimated based 
on the results of the subsidy rate equation (see equations (10) and (11)) by 
(14) 𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴 = Φ�1−𝑔𝑔+𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿�𝜎𝜎�𝜂𝜂 � . 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 denotes the vector of firm characteristics of the subsidy rate equation, 𝛿𝛿 denotes the estimated 
coefficients and 𝜎𝜎�𝜂𝜂 the estimated standard error from the left-truncated and right-censored Tobit 
estimation. Plugging 𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴 into equation (13) yields a Probit model for 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 that allows to 
identify the application probability by accounting for the estimated probability to receive a 
subsidy conditional on applying. 
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The application equation given by (7) can be simplified using (1), (2), and (8) receiving the 
probability of firm 𝑖𝑖 to apply for a subsidy. 
(15) 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = {𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[−𝐸𝐸(ln(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖))] > 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖} 
As not all applicants for R&D subsidies are observed in the data, the probability of firm 𝑖𝑖 to 
receive a subsidy (𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎) is estimated as equation (16) demonstrates. 
(16) 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖) = {𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 + 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[−𝐸𝐸(ln(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖))] > 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖} ∗ 𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴 
Thereby 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable taking on the value one in case firm 𝑖𝑖 received a subsidy, and 
zero otherwise (ACCEPTED). Accounting for the estimated probability of firm 𝑖𝑖 to be 
successful conditional on applying (𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴)  from equation (14) allows to identify the firm’s 
application probability.  
The term 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[−𝐸𝐸(ln(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖))] states firm 𝑖𝑖’s belief about how applying will increase its profits. 
It is estimated for each potential applicant in the sample. The subsidy rate decision allows to 
calculate a predicted subsidy rate for each firm i that depends on a vector of firm characteristics 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. Taking into account the distribution of the shock to the spillover rate 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 enables the 
estimation of the expected increase in profits from applying for each applicant. For this purpose 
the probability of firm 𝑖𝑖 to receive a certain subsidy rate is multiplied with the profits of firm 𝑖𝑖 
from receiving that specific subsidy rate. The application decision is estimated for all 90,999 
observations. The error term of the application decision is assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean zero and standard deviation of one.18 
The R&D investment decision. Taking the logs of the optimal R&D investment equation (2) 
yields 
(17) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)] = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗ is the actual project level R&D investment of the subsidized project 𝑖𝑖.19 The 
dependent variable in (17) is the amount of own funds the firm invests into project 𝑖𝑖, i.e. the 
R&D investment net of the subsidy amount. It is explained by a vector of firm characteristics 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 the shock to the marginal profitability of R&D. 
The R&D investment decision is estimated by a Heckman two-step procedure, where the first 
stage is the decision of a firm to apply with project 𝑖𝑖 and the second stage is the project-level 
R&D investment decision. The model is identified by two exclusion restrictions: First, the 
firm’s belief of how applying will affect its profits 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[−𝐸𝐸(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖))] and second, the SME 
status. SMEs may receive a 10% mark-up on the maximum subsidy rate, which should affect 
their application behaviour but should not affect the marginal profitability of R&D. As an effect 
of firm size in terms of the number of employees is taken into account when estimating the 
optimal R&D investment, the SME status itself should have no impact on the marginal 
profitability of R&D. While the application decision is estimated for 90,999 observations, the 
project level R&D investment decision is estimated for 2,320 observations. The estimation of 
(17) yields an estimate of the 𝛽𝛽 parameters, which measure the impact of firm characteristics 
                                                 
18 This is in contrast to Takalo et al. (2013a) who estimate the standard deviation of the error term of the application 
decision. The standard deviation is assumed to be one due to numerical problems encountered when estimating 
𝜎𝜎𝜐𝜐−𝜀𝜀. 
19 Note that for Germany the actual project level R&D investment of the subsidized project is observed, while 
Takalo et al. (2013a) observe the planned project level R&D investment for Finland. Therefore the latter estimate 
the amount of planned own funds the firm invests into project i employing the maximum subsidy rate ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖 which 
yields 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[(1 − ?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗(?̅?𝑠𝑖𝑖)], while I estimate for Germany the amount of actually spend own funds employing 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 
yielding 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖∗(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖)]. 
13 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 on the marginal profitability of R&D, and an estimate of the variance of the shock to the 
marginal profitability 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.  
Identification of application costs. Recall that the application costs are specified as 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 =exp(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖). The application cost parameters 𝜃𝜃 are identified through the application decision 
together with the R&D investment decision. 
The coefficients of the application decision in equation (16) take the form (𝛽𝛽 − 𝜃𝜃)/𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈−𝜀𝜀 for 
those firm characteristics that appear in 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. Thereby 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is the vector of firm characteristics 
in the R&D investment decision, while 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is a vector of firm characteristics affecting the 
application decision. The coefficient for the SME status which only appears in 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is given as 
−𝜃𝜃/𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈−𝜀𝜀. Recall that the β parameters are identified through the R&D investment equation and 
the standard deviation of the application decision 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈−𝜀𝜀 is assumed to be one, which allows to 
identify the application cost parameters 𝜃𝜃. Note that firms’ application costs are solely 
identified through the theoretical structure of the model. Standard errors of the application cost 
parameters are estimated by a bootstrap using 400 replications. 
The error term of the application cost shock function is given by 𝜈𝜈 = (1 + 𝜌𝜌)𝜀𝜀 + 𝜈𝜈0, dropping 
the subscript 𝑖𝑖. This shows that the application cost shock and the shock to the marginal 
profitability of project 𝑖𝑖 can be correlated with each other. The correlation of the marginal 
profitability shock 𝜀𝜀 with 𝜈𝜈 is given by 𝜌𝜌. The uncorrelated part of the application cost shock is 
captured in 𝜈𝜈0. 
Endogeneity. A common worry in the R&D subsidy evaluation literature is potential 
endogeneity of the subsidy decision. The model assumes that the shock to the spillover rate 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 
is uncorrelated with 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 the shock to the profitability of R&D. In the applied model spillovers of 
project 𝑖𝑖 affect the optimal R&D investment and thereby the profitability of R&D through the 
subsidy rate (see equation (17)). On the other hand spillovers 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  =  (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 +  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 are linear 
in the amount of R&D investments of project 𝑖𝑖 and therefore endogenous to 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, the shock to the 
marginal profitability of R&D. In contrast, the optimal subsidy rate increases in the amount of 
spillovers per euro of R&D and is therefore uncorrelated with 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (see equation (9)). 
Firm characteristics 𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊 and 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊. All three equations are estimated employing firm observables. 
The application decision and subsidy decision are estimated using the same set of firm 
observables 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. The R&D investment decision is estimated using a vector of firm characteristics 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, which contains the same variables as 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 except for the SME status, because the SME status 
is used as exclusion restriction in the Heckman selection model. As described in detail in section 
5, firm observables comprise firm age, number of employees, sales per employee, if the firm is 
part of a larger group, if the firm exports or not, having received R&D subsidies previously, the 
SME status, regional, industry and year dummies.  
Changes over time. The dataset at hand covers 18 years of observations from 1994 to 2011. In 
order to account for changes over time four different model specifications are estimated. The 
first specification estimates the structural model for all years from 1994 until 2011 as a pooled 
sample employing year dummies to account for changes over time (model 1). Second, in order 
to analyse changes over time in the explanatory variables, the model is estimated for three time 
blocks, each of six years length: 1994/99 (model 2), 2000/05 (model 3), and 2006/11 (model 
4). 
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 Estimation results 
7.1 The subsidy rate equation and spillovers 
The estimation of the subsidy rate equation (9) allows us to learn about the granting behaviour 
of the German federal government. Results for model 1 to 4 of the left-truncated and right-
censored Tobit estimation on the subsidy rate (SUBSRATE) are displayed in Table 2. The table 
displays coefficient estimates controlling for time, regional and sector dummies. The coefficient 
estimates of time, regional and sector dummies are displayed in Table 11 and Table 12 in the 
Appendix. 
Results demonstrate that SMEs receive on average a subsidy rate that is 3 percentage points 
above that of non-SMEs, all else equal. This reflects the possibility to grant SMEs a bonus of 
10% upon the maximum subsidy rate for industrial research is 50%. The effect on the subsidy 
rate for SMEs changed over time (see model 2, 3 and 4 in Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2). 
While SMEs do not receive a significantly higher subsidy rate in the period 1994/99, SMEs 
receive on average a 2.5 percentage points higher rate in the period 2000/05, which further 
increases to an average mark-up of 4.6 percentage points in the period 2006/11. This may reflect 
that the federal government increased its focus on supporting R&D activities of SMEs from the 
late 1990s on, when the conservative party under chancellor Helmut Kohl was replaced by the 
social democratic party under chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in 1998. Note that firms that are 
part of a larger enterprise group receive on average and all else equal a 3 percentage points 
lower subsidy rate. This may partly reflect that SMEs which are part of a group are not entitled 
to receive a bonus on the subsidy rate of 50%. 
Results demonstrate that over time projects of SMEs are perceived to generate higher spillovers 
per euro of R&D than projects of large firms. Yet total spillovers of SMEs are smaller than 
those of large firms, because the average project size of SMEs in the dataset is with 512,000 
euros smaller than the average project size of larger firms which is 780,000 euros. In that regard 
the findings are similar to those of Bloom et al. (2013) who find that smaller firms generate 
lower technological spillovers to other firms, because smaller firms operate in technology 
“niches”, where few other firms operate. Note, however, that the measure of spillovers is more 
general compared to Bloom et al. (2013) who only measure technological (or knowledge) 
spillovers that “increase the productivity of other firms that operate in similar technological 
areas” (p. 1314 Bloom et al. 2013). Spillovers in this study include not only technological 
spillovers to other firms but also the increase in consumer surplus due to newly created 
knowledge.  
Firm size in general affects the subsidy rate following a u-shape. At the turning point are firms 
with 8,103 employees, who receive on average and all else equal an 8.1 percentage points lower 
subsidy rate compared to firms with one employee. Note that the median subsidy receiving firm 
in the sample has 110 employees, and the average subsidy receiving firm has 1,295 employees 
(see Table 1 in section 5.3). Merely 4% of subsidy receivers in the sample have more than 8,000 
employees which implies that for most firms in the sample subsidies will decrease with 
increasing firm size. Interestingly, the effect of firm size on the subsidy rate becomes only 
significant from the year 2000 on, when also the SME effect becomes significant. 
Neither firm age (LNAGE) nor labour productivity measured by sales per employee 
(SALESEMP) affect the subsidy rate decision (see model 1). Looking at changes over time, I 
find a u-shaped relationship between sales per employee and the subsidy rate for the years 2006 
to 2011. The turning point is at sales of half a million euros per employee. Those firms receive 
a 3 percentage points lower subsidy rate compared to a firm that is making no sales. As in the 
case of firm size the majority of firms in the sample is located in the declining part of the u-
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shape relationship. Merely 3% of subsidized firms in the sample have sales per employee 
exceeding half a million euros per employee. Hence, in the years 2006 to 2011 R&D projects 
of firms with higher labour productivity are mostly perceived to generate less spillovers to the 
German society when compared to R&D projects of less productive firms. 
Table 2: Subsidy rate equation results 
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
SME  0.032***  0.022  0.025**  0.046***  
(0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) 
LNAGE  0.004  -0.033*  0.010  0.015  
(0.007) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010) 
LNAGE2  -0.001  0.005  -0.002  -0.003  
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
LNEMP  -0.018***  -0.006  -0.019***  -0.013**  
(0.004) (0.015) (0.007) (0.005) 
LNEMP2  0.001***  0.001  0.001**  0.001  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
SALESEMP  -0.023  0.031  0.045  -0.127**  
(0.024) (0.058) (0.039) (0.057) 
SALESEMP2  0.008  -0.029  -0.010  0.127*  
(0.016) (0.028) (0.025) (0.074) 
PREV_APPLICANT  -0.017***  -0.004  -0.014*  -0.020***  
(0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) 
LNPASTPROJ  0.011***  0.005  0.011**  0.011***  
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
EXPORTER  0.009*  0.018  0.004  0.008  
(0.005) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) 
GROUP  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.031***  
(0.004) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant  0.512***  0.491***  0.500***  0.492***  
(0.018) (0.062) (0.027) (0.024) 
Time dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Region dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂  0.081***  0.079***  0.075***  0.083***   (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wald-test   781***  107***  417***  404*** 
Log likelihood  2,313.76  264.64  904.46  1,198.65 
No. of obs.   2,320   356   813   1,151 
Note: Table displays coefficients of a left-truncated and right-censored Tobit model. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Estimation results for time, industry and region dummies 
are presented in Table 11 and Table 12 in the Appendix.  
Exporting firms receive on average a 0.9 percentage points larger subsidy rate than non-
exporting firms, all else equal. The effect is only weakly significant at the 10%-level. It signals, 
however, the importance of R&D projects undertaken by firms that are competing on 
international markets. 
Firms that have already received a subsidy in the past receive on average a 1.7 percentage points 
lower subsidy rate, all else equal. This effect is moderated by a positive effect on the subsidy 
rate that increases with the amount of past subsidized R&D projects. Firms that have received 
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five and more subsidized projects in the past have a higher subsidy rate on average when 
compared to firms that have not received funding in the past. In contrast, firms that have 
received funding previously for one to four projects receive a slightly lower subsidy rate than 
entirely unexperienced firms, all else equal. A look at changes over time reveals that this finding 
is true mostly for the years 2006 to 2011. It may reflect that very small firms which likely have 
not received any funding in the past could receive a higher maximum subsidy rate than medium 
sized firms from 2007 on. Starting in 2007, small firms with less than 10 employees and a 
maximum of 2 million euro sales per year, were allowed to receive a 20% mark-up on the 
maximum subsidy rate according to EU guidelines as compared to a 10% mark-up before (EC 
2006). 
Firms located in a region in eastern Germany receive a 3 to 4 percentage points higher subsidy 
rate on average, which corresponds to the possibility to grant firms located in economically 
disadvantaged regions an additional bonus of 10% on top of the maximum subsidy (Table 12 
in the Appendix). A look at changes over time demonstrates that the mark-up for firms located 
in eastern Germany disappears for all regions in the period 2006/11 except for Thuringia. 
Looking at the year dummies in model 1 shows that there are no substantial changes over time 
of the subsidy rate between 1994 and 2011, except for a mark-up in 1994 when compared to 
2011 (Table 11 in the Appendix). This indicates that the decision of the German federal 
government on the R&D subsidy rate granted to industrial research remained very stable over 
time. 
7.2 The application equation 
The application cost parameters are identified by the joint estimation of the R&D investment 
equation (17) and the application equation (16). Recall from section 6 that one can identify the 
application probability for firms in the sample even though only the probability to receive a 
subsidy is observed. This can be done by estimating the probability to receive a subsidy 
conditional upon applying 𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆/𝐴𝐴. 
Results indicate that applications almost never get rejected. This finding is in contrast to 
evaluation reports of federal thematic R&D programs in Germany which report that the success 
rate for applicants is rather low and varies between 5-25% (Aschhoff et al. 2012, BMBF 2015, 
Geyer et al. 2006, Staehler et al. 2006).20 One has to keep in mind, however, that overestimating 
the success probability, i.e. once applied a firm likely receives a subsidy, leads to 
underestimating the true number of applications of firms in the sample and hence to an 
overestimation of application costs. Most interesting is what this implies for findings of the 
estimated welfare effect of R&D subsidies to the German economy. If estimated application 
costs are too high the estimated social rate of return will be downward biased. While the 
estimate of the application probability deserves further scrutiny, the approach outlined in 
section 6 is employed in this paper. As this causes an upward bias of application costs and hence 
a downward bias of the social rate of return, presented results on the social impact of R&D 
subsidies in Germany in this paper may be seen as rather conservative. 
The estimated application costs for all four model specifications are displayed in Table 3. 
Coefficients for time, regions and industries are displayed in Table 13 and Table 14 in the 
Appendix. The results show that application costs are on average and all else equal 20% higher 
for SMEs, which is significant at the 1%-level. Firm size affects application costs in an inverse 
u-shape, which is weakly significant at a 10%-level. First, application costs increase with firm 
                                                 
20 See also an evaluation report of clusters of excellence by the RWI Essen http://www.rwi-essen.de/ 
media/content/pages/publikationen/rwi-projektberichte/RWI-PB_Spitzencluster.pdf. 
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size up to the turning point of firms with 61 employees, and then decrease again. Firms with 
more than 3,754 employees have lower application costs than firms with one employee.  
The results also provide evidence, that application costs are significantly lower for exporting 
firms and for firms that have received funding in the past. The latter finding highlights learning 
effects in applying for R&D funding and is in line with path dependency of receiving thematic 
R&D funding in Germany (Aschhoff 2010).  
Table 3: Application cost function results 
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
SME  0.195***  0.199*  0.145*  0.172**  
(0.045) (0.107) (0.080) (0.071) 
LNAGE  0.242  0.177  0.355  0.304  
(0.168) (0.275) (0.315) (0.293) 
LNAGE2  -0.029  -0.035  -0.038  -0.037  
(0.022) (0.043) (0.044) (0.036) 
LNEMP  0.107*  0.182  -0.014  0.146*  
(0.058) (0.182) (0.127) (0.076) 
LNEMP2  -0.013*  -0.007  -0.010  -0.014*  
(0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) 
SALESEMP  0.669*  1.640  1.207  -0.878  
(0.371) (1.231) (0.878) (0.705) 
SALESEMP2  -0.270  -0.864  -0.744  1.540*  
(0.275) (1.386) (0.895) (0.883) 
PREV_APPLICANT  -0.391  -0.187  -0.873*  -0.147  
(0.252) (0.596) (0.499) (0.280) 
LNPASTPROJ  -0.570**  -0.194  -1.119**  -0.423  
(0.228) (0.408) (0.462) (0.286) 
EXPORTER  -0.246*  -0.015  -0.097  -0.399**  
(0.128) (0.223) (0.181) (0.195) 
GROUP  0.082  -0.158  0.000  0.160  
(0.072) (0.183) (0.125) (0.109) 
constant  13.607***  11.932***  16.663***  12.681***  
(1.278) (3.028) (2.607) (1.375) 
Time dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Region dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
No. of obs.   90,999   22,419   29,083   39,497 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. The table displays coefficients of 
the cost function given by equation (8) 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖). Taking the log of equation (8) gives ln (𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖) = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 and demonstrates that coefficients in the cost function can be interpreted as semi-
elasticities. Estimation results for time, industry and region dummies are presented in Table 13 and 
Table 14 in the Appendix.  
There is no significant effect of firm age and of affiliation to an enterprise group on the 
application costs. Labour productivity also does not significantly affect application costs. An 
F-test on joint significance of SALESEMP and SALESEMP2 is rejected at the 10%-level. 
Regarding regional aspects, I find that application costs are similar across regions, except for 
firms located in Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, two regions in eastern Germany, in which 
application costs are significantly lower compared to firms located in Bavaria (see Table 14 in 
the Appendix). 
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Considering changes over time, the year dummies reveal that application costs were larger in 
the years 1994 to 2000 compared to application costs in 2011 (see Table 13 in the Appendix). 
There are only minor changes in firm characteristics over time, such as a stronger effect of 
internationally oriented firms (EXPORTER) on application costs in the period 2006/11 as 
compared to the years before. 
Results for Finland for the period 2000 to 2002 reported by Takalo et al. (2013a) demonstrate 
as well that past experience (the number of past applications) and export activity reduces 
application costs, while firm age does not have any effect. In contrast to findings for Germany, 
application costs are not higher for SMEs in the Finland. Moreover, instead of an inverse u-
shape relationship between firm size and application costs as found for Germany Takalo et al. 
(2013a) find a u-shape relationship for Finland. Besides, Finnish firms face higher application 
costs with increasing labour productivity, while labour productivity does not affect application 
costs in Germany.  
7.3 The R&D investment equation 
The effect of exogenous variables on marginal profitability of R&D is identified by the R&D 
investment equation (17) using a Heckman two-step procedure, where the first stage is the 
decision of a firm to apply with project 𝑖𝑖 and the second stage is the project-level R&D 
investment decision (see section 6). Hence, the resulting coefficients presented in Table 4 
display marginal effects. Estimation results for time, region and industry dummies are presented 
in Table 15 and Table 16 in the Appendix. 
The results for model 1 demonstrate that both firm size and labour productivity (SALESEMP) 
increase the marginal profitability ceteris paribus. Both coefficients are significant at the 5%-
level. In contrast, firm age, export status, past funding experience, or affiliation to an enterprise 
group do not affect the marginal profitability of R&D. In addition, looking at models 2, 3 and 
4 there are no substantial changes over time in the impact of firm characteristics on R&D. 
Results are in line with findings for Finland where the marginal profitability of R&D projects 
increases as well in firm size and labour productivity. 
The marginal profitability of projects conducted by firms located in eastern German regions is 
significantly lower than the marginal profitability of R&D projects conducted by firms in the 
reference group which are located in Bavaria (see Table 16 in the Appendix). This is also true 
for firms located in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein (REG2) as well as for firms from Lower 
Saxony and Bremen (REG3), which are regions in the north-west of Germany. 
General changes over time identified by the year dummies (see Table 15 in the Appendix, model 
1) show a significantly larger marginal profitability of subsidized research projects in the years 
1994 to 2000 (except for 1997), as well as for the years 2002, 2004, 2009 when compared to 
the profitability of funded projects in 2011. Within the model framework this implies that the 
profitability of ideas decreased over time in Germany. Thinking outside the theory model this 
finding might reflect a change in German funding policies not reflected in the theoretical 
framework. A closer look to the R&D subsidy data reveals that the number of firms which 
received thematic R&D funding in the sample increased clearly since 2001. As these firms were 
mainly SME’s, the average size of the subsidized R&D project in the sample decreased. In 
addition, comparatively more very large projects, with a volume of more than one million euro, 
where funded in the years 2002 and 2009/10. The peaks in 2002 and 2009 may be explained by 
increased governmental support for industrial R&D in these years. In 2002 the German federal 
government profited a short-term increase in its budget due to the large revenues from the sale 
of UMTS-licenses and in 2009 governmental support for industrial R&D was expanded to 
combat the financial crisis. 
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Table 4: R&D investment estimation results 
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
LNAGE  -0.072  0.144  0.018  -0.172  
(0.163) (0.274) (0.302) (0.282) 
LNAGE2  0.004  -0.034  0.003  0.011  
(0.021) (0.044) (0.041) (0.034) 
LNEMP  0.116**  0.217  0.045  0.139*  
(0.051) (0.166) (0.107) (0.071) 
LNEMP2  -0.004  0.001  -0.006  -0.003  
(0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.008) 
SALESEMP  0.693**  1.998  0.805  -0.149  
(0.323) (1.262) (0.752) (0.708) 
SALESEMP2  -0.404*  -1.009  -0.628  0.597  
(0.237) (1.503) (0.869) (0.935) 
PREV_APPLICANT  0.079  0.411  -0.423  0.253  
(0.246) (0.560) (0.481) (0.280) 
LNPASTPROJ  0.016  0.448  -0.486  0.172  
(0.226) (0.397) (0.463) (0.282) 
EXPORTER  -0.041  0.133  0.033  -0.137  
(0.126) (0.226) (0.169) (0.192) 
GROUP  0.078  -0.253  0.051  0.141  
(0.065) (0.176) (0.107) (0.101) 
constant  12.068***  9.688***  15.023***  11.490***  
(1.274) (3.018) (2.537) (1.392) 
Time dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Region dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Mills lambda  -0.208  0.571  -1.234  0.137   (0.521) (0.898) (0.996) (0.654) 
R2  0.186  0.308  0.209  0.170 
No. of obs.   2,320   356   813   1,151 
Note: Table displays coefficients of a Heckman-selection model. Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses (400 replications). Exclusion restrictions are the SME dummy and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[−𝐸𝐸(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖))], 
which is the expected increase in profits of firm i due to applying. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Estimation results for time, industry and region dummies are presented in Table 15 and Table 16 in the 
Appendix. 
7.4 The covariance structure 
Table 5 presents the estimated standard deviations of the error terms and the covariance between 
unobservables in the application and investment equation for model 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
It shows that the standard deviation of the shock to the spillover rate per euro of R&D (𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂) is 
pretty low in Germany with 0.08 on average and that it hardly varies over time. The standard 
deviation of the shock to the marginal profitability of a project (𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀) is on average 1.01. 
Interestingly it is slightly higher for the period 2000/05 compared to the periods before and 
after.  
Recall that the error term of the application cost shock function is given by 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 = (1 + 𝜌𝜌)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 +
𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖. Then 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈0 is the standard deviation of the uncorrelated part of the application cost shock and 
𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜈𝜈 is the correlation between 𝜀𝜀 the shock to the marginal profitability of R&D and 𝜈𝜈 the 
application cost shock. It is identified from the joint estimation of the application decision and 
20 
 
the R&D investment decision in the Heckman selection model and reflects how the unobserved 
marginal profitability of a project affects the application costs and hence the application 
probability of a firm. As Table 5 demonstrates 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜈𝜈 is negative but insignificant in model 1, i.e. 
when looking at the total period of observation 1994 to 2011. Interestingly, this relationship 
changes over time. While 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜈𝜈 is positive in the periods 1994/99 and 2006/11, it becomes 
negative and significant for the period 2000/05. This demonstrates substantial heterogeneity of 
the relationship between the unobserved profitability of ideas and application costs over time. 
A higher unobserved marginal profitability of ideas increased the application probability and 
decreased application costs in the periods 1994/99 and 2006/11, while it increased application 
costs in 2000/05. 
Table 5: Covariance structure results 
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀  1.001***  1.022***  1.487**  0.980*** 
Standard deviation of the investment equation (0.168) (0.358) (0.601) (0.202)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂  0.081***  0.079***  0.075***  0.083*** 
Standard deviation of the spillover shock (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈0  0.979***  0.829***  0.558**  0.990*** 
Standard deviation of the uncorrelated part of 
the application cost function shock 
(0.142) (0.247) (0.276) (0.161) 
1 + 𝜌𝜌  -0.204  0.547  -0.558**  0.142 
Measure of the variance share of 𝜀𝜀 in 𝜈𝜈 (0.335) (0.488) (0.271) (0.411)     
 
 
 
 
 
𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜈𝜈  -0.206  0.559  -0.830*  0.139 
Correlation between 𝜀𝜀 and 𝜈𝜈 the application 
equation error term 
  (0.402)   (0.612)   (0.435)   (0.499) 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (400 replications). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀 is identified in the estimation of the R&D investment equation, 𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂 is identified in the estimation of 
the subsidy rate equation, and 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜈𝜈 is identified from the joint estimation of the application decision and 
the R&D investment decision in the Heckman selection model.  
By definition the correlation 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜈𝜈 = 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝜀𝜀,𝜈𝜈)𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈 = (1+𝜌𝜌)𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈 = (1+𝜌𝜌)𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈 , which allows to calculate the measure 
of the variance share of 𝜀𝜀 in 𝜈𝜈: (1 + 𝜌𝜌)= 𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝜈𝜈  𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀
. 
𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈0 is calculated form of the application equation error term 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 = (1 + 𝜌𝜌)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖, so that 𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈0 =
�(𝜎𝜎𝜈𝜈2 − (1 + 𝜌𝜌)2𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2).  
Takalo et al. (2013a) find for Finland for the years 2000/02 that the unobserved marginal 
profitability of an R&D project increases application costs and therefore reduces the application 
probability significantly. The authors argue that this may reflect difficulties to write 
applications for very profitable and potentially also very complex project ideas. However, 
results for Germany reveal that this relationship may not be that straight forward since it can 
vary over time. 
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7.5 Robustness of the results 
The model of the R&D subsidy process by Takalo et al. (2013a) assumes that the error term of 
the subsidy rate equation is uncorrelated with the error terms of the investment and application 
equation. To test if that assumption holds, I checked for potential selection bias in the subsidy 
rate equation. Therefore in the first step, the Probit model on the application decision was 
estimated leaving out the expected subsidy term. In a second step the subsidy rate equation was 
estimated including the inverse Mills ratio. As exclusion restriction I use the interaction terms 
between the SME dummy and several firm characteristics such as firm age, sales per employee, 
exporter as well as regions located in eastern Germany. In none of the applied specifications 
the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio was significant. This validates the assumption that the 
shock to the spillover rate is uncorrelated to the shock of the application and R&D investment 
decision. 
Another assumption is that spillovers are linear in the firms R&D investment (𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉 𝜕𝜕𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖⁄ =
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖). I checked this assumption by including the project-level R&D investment and its 
interactions with firm characteristics and regions into the estimation of the subsidy rate 
decision. Neither the direct effect of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, nor its interactions were significant at the 5%-level.  
This finding supports the assumption that spillovers are linear in R&D investment. 
 Effects of the subsidy 
8.1 Firm effect, application costs and spillover effect 
The model of the R&D subsidy process allows the calculation of the expected benefits of R&D 
subsidies for the firm and the German federal government. The firm benefits from an R&D 
subsidy by increased expected profits due to the subsidy (firm effect). All benefits not captured 
by the firm that spill over to the German economy are captured by the subsidy decision of the 
federal government (spillover effect). Assuming that the German federal government 
maximizes total welfare, the firm and the spillover effect constitute the overall increase in 
welfare due to R&D subsidies in Germany.21  
The firm effect is estimated by plugging in the estimated coefficients into the firm’s profit 
function (equation (1)), the optimal R&D investment decision (equation (2)), and the 
application cost function (equation (8)). The spillover effect is estimated by inserting estimated 
coefficients, the granted subsidy rates and R&D investments into  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖)𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =
�𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝑔𝑔)�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖, which is retrieved from equations (5) and (6). The calculation of 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is 
adjusted for firms at the lower and upper bound of the subsidy rate by integrating over the 
relevant domain of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖.  
In addition, the distribution of the shocks to the marginal profitability of a project 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and the 
shock to the application cost function 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖, as well as their correlation have to be taken into 
account. Recall that 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 = (1 + 𝜌𝜌)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖. Therefore effects of the subsidies are calculated 
using two approaches. First, both effects are integrated over the domain of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖. Second, 
                                                 
21 If one is not willing to believe that the federal government maximizes social welfare, at the minimum it is 
observed what the federal government itself gets out of funding a certain project. It is, however, likely that the 
variation in the subsidy rate reflects the valuation of a project to some extend and that the federal government will 
be sufficiently incentivized to pick socially valuable projects so that the subsidy rate reflects spillovers or at least 
differences between spillovers of projects. 
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the effects are calculated using the estimated value of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 which is identified from the R&D 
investment equation and then integrated over the domain of 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖.22 
Results of the calculated effects of both approaches are displayed in Table 6 for the total sample 
from 1994 to 2011 (model 1). The first row shows the median and mean gross firm effect on 
subsidy receivers, i.e. the increase in firm profits due to the subsidy, gross of application costs. 
The increase in gross firm profits is estimated to be 207,644 euros for the median firm in the 
period 1994 to 2011 when integrating over the domains of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖. The effect is 40% lower 
when using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. Estimated means are closer to each other, but again the value using 
the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is 10% lower.  
The second row of Table 6 displays the net firm effect, i.e. the expected increase in firm profits 
due to the subsidy, net of application costs. Here the heterogeneity between the two approaches 
is even stronger. Now the estimated net firm effect is by 60% lower when integrating over the 
domains of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖 compared to using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. Differences in mean values are even 
more pronounced. The large difference in the net firm effect arises due strong differences in the 
estimated application costs, displayed in row three. 
Table 6: Effects of the subsidies in euro  
    Integration over do- mains of 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊 and 𝝂𝝂𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊 
 Estimated 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊, 
integration over 𝝂𝝂𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊 
   median mean  median mean 
Gross firm effect on subsidy receivers 
 
207,644 227,283 
 
123,078 204,443        
Net firm effect on subsidy receivers 
 
65,644 79,340 
 
113,681 190,943        
Application costs of subsidy receivers 
 
138,360 147,943 
 
7,238 13,500        
Spillover effect generated by subsidy receivers   206,640 236,918   122,458 204,878 
Note: Effects are calculated using the total sample from 1994 to 2011 (model 1). 
Estimated application costs are 7,238 euros for the median firm when using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
while integrating over 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 yields much higher estimated application costs of 138,359 euros. 
Given the observation that applicant firms invest about 15 to 40 person days to file a full 
application (Aschhoff et al. 2012), the estimated application costs using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 seem 
more plausible.23 
Estimated spillover effects to the German economy generated by subsidy receivers are 
displayed in row four of Table 6. In both approaches the estimated spillover effect is close to 
the estimate of the increase in firm profits. It shows that even though results show considerable 
heterogeneity between the absolute effect of a subsidy on firms’ gross profits and spillovers, 
the relative estimate does not change. Firms appropriate about 50% of the total welfare increase 
induced by thematic R&D subsidies in Germany. This finding is in line with Peters et al. (2009), 
                                                 
22 For a detailed description on how to calculate the two approaches the reader is referred to Takalo et al. (2013a, 
Appendix 8). 
23 The observation of Aschhoff et al. (2012) refers to applicants of the thematic R&D program “SME innovative”. 
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who estimate the social return of R&D investments of firms in Germany in the period 1991 to 
2005.24 
Results for Finland found by Takalo et al. (2013) show a similar pattern as results for Germany. 
First, using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, estimated application costs are also lower as compared to 
integrating over 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. Second, in Finland firms appropriate 60% of the total welfare effect, and 
hence slightly more than firms in Germany. The estimated spillover effect is more than three 
times larger though in Germany when compared to Finland. This is not surprising, given that 
the German economy is much larger than the Finnish economy. In the year 2000, for instance, 
the German economy was 15 times larger than the Finnish economy. According to the model 
assumptions, the federal government is only concerned about how spillovers of subsidized 
R&D projects affect the national economy. Hence, the German federal government can assume 
that more spillovers are realized within Germany, while the Finnish funding agency must take 
into account that a considerable share of spillovers will be realized outside of Finland. 
8.2 The social rate of return 
The expected rate of return on the subsidy rate is calculated assuming that the federal 
government behaves as a benevolent social planner. The social rate of return is calculated at the 
project-level by dividing the benefits due to subsidies (the project’s net firm effect and spillover 
effect) by the cost of the subsidy (subsidy amount of the project). Thereby the opportunity costs 
of funding, i.e. tax distortions, are ignored. The expected rate of return of thematic R&D 
subsidies in Germany is positive with on average 1.34 using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and negative with 
on average 0.88 when integrating over 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the rate of return is very 
centred demonstrating little heterogeneity across firms. 
The different ways of calculating the benefits and costs of the subsidy leads to relatively large 
differences in the social rate of return. As Table 7 shows the main driver of these differences is 
the significant disparity in estimated application costs. Using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 the retrieved 
application costs amount to merely 5-10% of the estimated application costs when integrating 
over 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. As noted before, the estimated application costs using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 are more 
reasonable. Therefore, also the estimated rate of return of 34% seems more likely. 
Note that the high estimated application costs, may also be driven by the fact that rejected 
applicants are not observed in the German subsidy database. Even though this specific feature 
of the data is accounted for in the empirical implementation, the high rejection rate of applicants 
in Germany is not reflected in the data (see section 7.2). Therefore the model may underestimate 
the application probability and hence overestimate application costs. 
To complete the picture let us, in addition, consider differences in the social rate of return that 
may occur between small and large firms as well as between firms located in eastern and 
western Germany. Table 7 shows the estimated rate of returns for the different scenarios. It is 
obvious that the estimated rates of return do neither differ between small and large firms nor 
between West and East German firms. They are remarkable stable across different scenarios. 
In summary, the estimated social rate of return using the estimated 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is highly plausible 
compared to the results when integrating over the domain of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. Accordingly, one euro of 
thematic R&D subsidies yield on average a social return of 1.34 euros in Germany in the period 
1994 to 2011. Recall that opportunity costs of funding, such as tax distortions and 
administrative costs, are not included in the calculation of the social rate of return. Following 
Takalo et al. (2013a) who assume opportunity costs of 20% for Finland, I find that with an 
                                                 
24 Peters et al. (2009) find that if a firm invests one euro into R&D its productivity increases on average by 0.41 
euros, while knowledge spillovers to other firms amount to 0.52-0.62 euros. 
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estimated rate of return of 34% thematic R&D subsidies increase opportunity costs of 20% in 
Germany and hence are welfare increasing in Germany.25 
Figure 2: Distribution of the rate of return 
 
Table 7: Rate of return to the subsidy, 1994-2011 
    All   SMEs   Large   East   West 
   median mean  median mean  median mean  median mean  median mean 
Integration 
over 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖 
 0.91 0.88  0.91 0.89  0.92 0.87  0.92 0.91  0.91 0.87 
Est. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, integr-
ation over 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖 
 1.35 1.34  1.35 1.33  1.35 1.34  1.36 1.34  1.34 1.33 
No. of obs.   2,320   1,401   919   748   1,572 
 
The estimated social rate of return for Finland is with 1.51 using the estimated epsilon slightly 
larger compared to the estimated value for Germany (see Takalo et al. 2013a). Note that the 
estimated rates of return are values at the margin, i.e. per euro of R&D subsidies. Recall that 
the spillover effect and the gross firm effect are larger for Germany than for Finland. Hence, 
the smaller social rate of return at the margin in Germany is due to higher subsidies in Germany. 
Note that within the model framework, the optimal social rate of return is estimated. Even 
though the social rate of return in Germany is smaller at the margin than in Finland, the total 
effect on welfare in Germany may be larger as subsidies in Germany are higher.26  
                                                 
25 Note that as most tax distortions arise through income tax, the estimate of 20% may be too high for Germany, 
where income tax distortions are estimated to be between 3-4% (Blaufuss et al. 2011). 
26 While the average subsidy rate for Finland is 32% as compared to 48% in Germany, the average size of the 
subsidized R&D project is rather similar with on average 634,300 euros for Finland and on average 619,900 euros 
for Germany (see Takalo et al 2013a). 
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 Conclusions 
The majority of studies evaluating the effects of R&D subsidies analyse input and output 
additionalities and find that R&D subsidies in Germany increase both the innovative input and 
output of subsidized firms. In contrast, this study analyses the overall benefits and costs of 
distributing R&D subsidies in Germany covering a long period of 18 years from 1994 to 2011. 
The analysis is based on a structural model of the R&D subsidy process designed by Takalo et 
al. (2013a). 
Employing project level R&D subsidy data of thematic R&D subsidies for Germany, the 
analysis shows that the subsidy rate decision remained remarkably stable over time. The 
spillover rate, i.e. spillovers per euro of R&D, is estimated to be larger for SMEs and firms 
located in eastern Germany and smaller for large firms and firms that are part of an enterprise 
group. Even though results show that SMEs generate higher spillovers per euro of R&D, total 
spillovers of SMEs are smaller than those of large firms, because the average project size of 
SMEs is in the dataset is smaller than the average project size of larger firms. 
Estimated application costs are significantly lower for firms that have already received R&D 
funding in the past, demonstrating path dependency and a learning curve. With respect to firm 
size, results show that SMEs have to bear higher application costs compared to non-SMEs. 
Overall, application costs in Germany declined over time, being higher on average in the years 
1994 to 2000 compared to 2011.  
Considering the estimated profitability of R&D, results show that the profitability of R&D is 
significantly higher for large firms and for firms with a high labour productivity, but lower for 
firms located in eastern Germany. The profitability of R&D also declined over time, i.e. it was 
higher in the years 1994 to 2000 compared to the year 2011. Given the model framework, this 
finding indicates that the quality of ideas in Germany decreased over time. An alternative 
explanation for this finding is that the extended subsidy policy from 2001 on was targeted to 
rather small and medium-sized projects, while the number of large projects with a volume of 
more than one million euro remained rather constant over time in the sample. 
Thematic R&D subsidies affect firms’ profits to the same extent as spillovers to the German 
economy that are not captured by the firms’ profits.27 Assuming that the German federal 
government behaves as a benevolent social planner, the estimated social rate of return to the 
subsidy is 34%, which exceeds the assumed opportunity costs of 20%. Hence, results 
demonstrate that thematic R&D subsidies in Germany are welfare increasing. Interestingly, the 
estimated social rate of return does not differ with respect to firm size and location in western 
or eastern Germany.  
Clearly, the conducted analysis of estimating the benefits of R&D subsidies for Germany has 
its limitations. First, the data does not contain rejected applicants. The analysis accounts for this 
fact, but it shows that the model does not reflect the actual rejection rates in Germany. Therefore 
estimates of the application cost should be considered with caution, as observing rejected 
applications would likely reduce the estimated application costs. It is up to future work to find 
a more accurate way of estimating the application costs for Germany. Second, subsidies from 
generic R&D programs are not observed which may bias results especially for SMEs and firms 
located in eastern Germany to whom generic subsidy programs are especially targeted. Third, 
the model of the R&D subsidy process does neither consider fixed costs of R&D nor external 
                                                 
27 Recall that the term “spillovers” contains not only knowledge or technology spillovers to other firms but also 
increase in consumer surplus. In other words spillovers are all the good and bad things from an innovation project 
that flow to the German economy and are not reflected in the profits of the firm that conducts the innovation 
project. 
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finance of R&D, both of which will affect the optimal R&D investment decision of firms and 
the optimal subsidy rate and application decision. These shortcomings have been incorporated 
in an enhanced version of the theory model of the R&D subsidy process by Takalo et al. (2013b, 
2017) and should guide future research in this area. 
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Appendix 
Table 8: Regional dummies 
Variable Region 
    
REG1 Bavaria 
REG2 Hamburg & Schleswig-Holstein 
REG3 Lower Saxony & Bremen 
REG4 North Rhine-Westphalia 
REG5 Hesse 
REG6 Rhineland-Palatinate & Saarland 
REG7 Baden-Württemberg 
REG8* Berlin, Brandenburg & Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 
REG9* Saxony & Saxony-Anhalt 
REG10* Thuringia 
Note: * Regions in eastern Germany, including West Berlin. 
Table 9: Definition of industry dummies 
Variable   Industry 
     
N1  Chemicals and plastics 
N2  Mineral products (metal and non-metal) 
N3  Machinery and equipment 
N4  Office machinery, electrical machinery, and apparatus 
N5  Radio, television, and communication equipment 
N6  Medical, precision, and optical instruments 
N7  Vehicles and transport equipment 
N8  Other manufacturing 
N9  Energy, water, and recycling 
N10  IT and telecommunication 
N11  R&D, architects, and engineers 
N12   Other services, construction, and transport 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics of regional, industry and year dummies 
Variable   Subsidy receivers  Non-subsidy receivers 
   mean s.d.  mean s.d. 
REG1  0.15 0.35  0.14 0.35 
REG2  0.04 0.19  0.04 0.19 
REG3  0.08 0.26  0.09 0.29 
REG4  0.15 0.36  0.18 0.38 
REG5  0.05 0.23  0.06 0.24 
REG6  0.04 0.20  0.04 0.19 
REG7  0.17 0.37  0.13 0.34 
REG8#  0.09 0.29  0.10 0.30 
REG9#  0.18 0.38  0.16 0.37 
REG10#  0.05 0.23  0.06 0.24 
N1  0.10 0.30  0.09 0.28 
N2  0.08 0.27  0.12 0.33 
N3  0.14 0.35  0.09 0.28 
N4  0.05 0.22  0.04 0.20 
N5  0.07 0.26  0.01 0.12 
N6  0.14 0.35  0.05 0.22 
N7  0.06 0.23  0.03 0.18 
N8  0.04 0.21  0.18 0.38 
N9  0.03 0.16  0.04 0.21 
N10  0.08 0.27  0.05 0.22 
N11  0.16 0.36  0.08 0.28 
N12  0.06 0.24  0.20 0.40 
YEAR1994  0.03 0.16  0.03 0.17 
YEAR1995  0.02 0.13  0.05 0.22 
YEAR1996  0.02 0.14  0.04 0.20 
YEAR1997  0.03 0.16  0.03 0.18 
YEAR1998  0.02 0.15  0.04 0.21 
YEAR1999  0.04 0.20  0.05 0.22 
YEAR2000  0.03 0.18  0.05 0.21 
YEAR2001  0.08 0.27  0.05 0.21 
YEAR2002  0.07 0.25  0.05 0.21 
YEAR2003  0.04 0.20  0.06 0.23 
YEAR2004  0.06 0.23  0.06 0.23 
YEAR2005  0.07 0.25  0.07 0.25 
YEAR2006  0.06 0.24  0.06 0.24 
YEAR2007  0.08 0.26  0.08 0.27 
YEAR2008  0.07 0.25  0.07 0.26 
YEAR2009  0.12 0.33  0.09 0.28 
YEAR2010  0.11 0.31  0.08 0.27 
YEAR2011  0.06 0.23  0.05 0.22 
No. of obs.  2,320  88,679 
Notes: #Regions in eastern Germany, including West Berlin. Columns with heading s.d. display the 
standard deviation. 
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Table 11: Subsidy rate estimation results for years of observation  
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
YEAR1994  0.063***  0.034**      
(0.014) (0.017) 
YEAR1995  0.022  -0.002      
(0.015) (0.017) 
YEAR1996  0.014  -0.014      
(0.015) (0.016) 
YEAR1997  -0.002  -0.027*      
(0.013) (0.014) 
YEAR1998  0.011  -0.019      
(0.013) (0.015) 
YEAR1999  0.012        
(0.011) 
YEAR2000  -0.001    0.012    
(0.012) (0.011) 
YEAR2001  0.015    0.027***    
(0.009) (0.008) 
YEAR2002  0.009    0.023**    
(0.010) (0.009) 
YEAR2003  0.013    0.020**    
(0.011) (0.010) 
YEAR2004  -0.003    0.007    
(0.010) (0.009) 
YEAR2005  -0.010        
(0.010) 
YEAR2006  0.000      -0.001  
(0.010) (0.010) 
YEAR2007  -0.008      -0.008  
(0.009) (0.010) 
YEAR2008  -0.008      -0.010  
(0.010) (0.010) 
YEAR2009  0.002      0.001  
(0.009) (0.009) 
YEAR2010  -0.003      -0.004 
  (0.009)     (0.009) 
𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂  0.081***  0.079***  0.075***  0.083***   (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wald  781***  107***  417***  404*** 
Log likelihood  2313.76  264.64  904.46  1198.65 
No. of obs.   2,320   356   813   1,151 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
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Table 12: Subsidy rate estimation results for regions and industries  
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
REG2  0.021**  0.031  0.002  0.035**  
(0.010) (0.030) (0.015) (0.015) 
REG3  0.014*  0.005  0.035***  0.009  
(0.008) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) 
REG4  0.004  -0.007  0.006  0.005  
(0.006) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) 
REG5  0.005  0.032  0.002  -0.000  
(0.009) (0.022) (0.015) (0.012) 
REG6  0.015  0.062*  0.023  0.008  
(0.010) (0.037) (0.015) (0.013) 
REG7  0.006  0.017  0.012  0.003  
(0.006) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) 
REG8#  0.031***  0.064***  0.055***  0.008  
(0.007) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) 
REG9#  0.034***  0.060***  0.054***  0.013  
(0.006) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) 
REG10#  0.038***  0.019  0.048***  0.038***  
(0.009) (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) 
N2  -0.005  -0.006  -0.011  0.003  
(0.008) (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) 
N3  -0.004  0.001  -0.022*  0.006  
(0.007) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) 
N4  -0.003  0.011  -0.016  0.003  
(0.010) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) 
N5  -0.014  -0.016  -0.026*  0.004  
(0.009) (0.022) (0.015) (0.012) 
N6  -0.017**  -0.008  -0.022*  -0.014  
(0.007) (0.021) (0.012) (0.010) 
N7  0.005  -0.003  -0.012  0.019  
(0.009) (0.024) (0.016) (0.013) 
N8  0.008  0.017  -0.004  0.011  
(0.010) (0.026) (0.015) (0.016) 
N9  0.028**  0.074**  0.022  0.026  
(0.013) (0.036) (0.026) (0.018) 
N10  -0.014*  0.003  -0.016  -0.019*  
(0.008) (0.038) (0.014) (0.011) 
N11  0.012  0.030  0.009  0.011  
(0.007) (0.024) (0.012) (0.010) 
N12  0.005  0.027  -0.022  0.020  
(0.009) (0.030) (0.015) (0.013) 
𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂  0.081***  0.079***  0.075***  0.083***   (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wald  781***  107***  417***  404*** 
Log likelihood  2313.76  264.64  904.46  1198.65 
No. of obs.   2,320   356   813   1,151 
Notes: #Regions in eastern Germany, including West Berlin. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01.   
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Table 13: Application cost function results for years of observation  
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
YEAR1994  0.628***  -0.123      
(0.217) (0.203) 
YEAR1995  1.077***  -0.044      
(0.226) (0.254) 
YEAR1996  1.052***  0.016      
(0.203) (0.244) 
YEAR1997  0.106  -0.810***      
(0.208) (0.221) 
YEAR1998  0.725***  -0.308      
(0.185) (0.215) 
YEAR1999  0.862***        
(0.174) 
YEAR2000  0.576***    0.545**    
(0.169) (0.212) 
YEAR2001  -0.330    -0.677**    
(0.236) (0.325) 
YEAR2002  0.163    -0.094    
(0.189) (0.217) 
YEAR2003  0.264    0.350    
(0.191) (0.256) 
YEAR2004  0.385**    0.356**    
(0.148) (0.174) 
YEAR2005  0.083        
(0.140) 
YEAR2006  0.122      0.126  
(0.153) (0.140) 
YEAR2007  0.071      0.110  
(0.150) (0.145) 
YEAR2008  0.208      0.204  
(0.145) (0.139) 
YEAR2009  0.240      0.346*  
(0.180) (0.184) 
YEAR2010  -0.023      0.045 
  (0.162)     (0.160) 
No. of obs.   90,999   22,419   29,083   39,497 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 14: Application cost function results for regions and industries  
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
REG2  -0.161  0.155  -0.327  -0.128  
(0.171) (0.442) (0.329) (0.215) 
REG3  -0.132  -0.040  -0.233  -0.176  
(0.119) (0.269) (0.242) (0.165) 
REG4  -0.081  0.098  -0.018  -0.203*  
(0.091) (0.230) (0.210) (0.121) 
REG5  0.128  0.699**  0.123  -0.073  
(0.127) (0.282) (0.290) (0.159) 
REG6  -0.046  1.039**  -0.400  -0.111  
(0.146) (0.459) (0.315) (0.193) 
REG7  0.054  0.214  -0.085  0.019  
(0.083) (0.189) (0.220) (0.117) 
REG8#  -0.170  0.296  -0.444**  -0.181  
(0.112) (0.274) (0.218) (0.150) 
REG9#  -0.428***  -0.308  -0.976***  -0.258**  
(0.091) (0.243) (0.289) (0.128) 
REG10#  -0.094  -0.077  -0.309  -0.075  
(0.150) (0.349) (0.282) (0.151) 
N2  -0.070  0.102  -0.210  -0.060  
(0.141) (0.344) (0.270) (0.221) 
N3  -0.369***  -0.661*  -0.251  -0.241*  
(0.098) (0.378) (0.241) (0.131) 
N4  0.096  -0.627  0.487  0.185  
(0.133) (0.419) (0.319) (0.186) 
N5  -0.424**  -0.656  -0.169  -0.392*  
(0.208) (0.580) (0.411) (0.229) 
N6  -0.366***  -0.359  -0.493  -0.308*  
(0.142) (0.416) (0.346) (0.165) 
N7  -0.170  -0.292  -0.005  -0.138  
(0.131) (0.423) (0.363) (0.187) 
N8  -0.179  -0.266  -0.168  -0.403  
(0.251) (0.381) (0.331) (0.497) 
N9  -0.155  -1.087*  0.684  -0.264  
(0.201) (0.652) (0.543) (0.250) 
N10  -0.176  0.124  -0.441  -0.174  
(0.141) (0.537) (0.362) (0.160) 
N11  -0.247*  -0.127  -0.354  -0.212  
(0.149) (0.433) (0.316) (0.165) 
N12  0.110  0.375  0.414  -0.119  
(0.181) (0.485) (0.363) (0.244) 
No. of obs.   90,999   22,419   29,083   39,497 
Notes: #Regions in eastern Germany, including West Berlin. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.10, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
  
35 
 
Table 15: R&D investment estimation results for years of observation  
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
YEAR1994  0.605***  -0.088      
(0.191) (0.196) 
YEAR1995  0.836***  -0.207      
(0.212) (0.243) 
YEAR1996  0.889***  -0.087      
(0.184) (0.238) 
YEAR1997  0.195  -0.673***      
(0.190) (0.214) 
YEAR1998  0.576***  -0.418**      
(0.163) (0.212) 
YEAR1999  0.837***        
(0.150) 
YEAR2000  0.519***    0.397**    
(0.144) (0.172) 
YEAR2001  0.002    -0.440    
(0.225) (0.310) 
YEAR2002  0.358**    0.010    
(0.168) (0.185) 
YEAR2003  0.112    0.118    
(0.177) (0.229) 
YEAR2004  0.390***    0.276**    
(0.129) (0.139) 
YEAR2005  0.172        
(0.124) 
YEAR2006  0.149      0.143  
(0.134) (0.134) 
YEAR2007  0.157      0.178  
(0.131) (0.133) 
YEAR2008  0.192      0.188  
(0.134) (0.135) 
YEAR2009  0.507***      0.599***  
(0.166) (0.171) 
YEAR2010  0.212      0.271* 
  (0.149)     (0.152) 
Mills lambda  -0.208  0.571  -1.234  0.137   (0.521) (0.898) (0.996) (0.654) 
R2  0.186  0.308  0.209  0.170 
No. of obs.   2,320   356   813   1,151 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (400 replications). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 16: R&D investment estimation results for regions and industries 
    Model (1)   Model (2)   Model (3)   Model (4) 
   1994-2011  1994-1999  2000-2005  2006-2011 
REG2  -0.348**  -0.119  -0.342  -0.395**  
(0.156) (0.381) (0.291) (0.195) 
REG3  -0.226**  0.031  -0.294  -0.355**  
(0.107) (0.274) (0.200) (0.161) 
REG4  -0.133*  0.038  -0.071  -0.225**  
(0.080) (0.222) (0.176) (0.113) 
REG5  0.067  0.551**  0.077  -0.087  
(0.105) (0.256) (0.247) (0.137) 
REG6  -0.054  0.634  -0.315  -0.097  
(0.133) (0.399) (0.272) (0.169) 
REG7  0.035  0.160  -0.061  -0.016  
(0.072) (0.180) (0.183) (0.101) 
REG8#  -0.303***  -0.003  -0.513***  -0.278**  
(0.099) (0.256) (0.186) (0.138) 
REG9#  -0.484***  -0.450*  -0.862***  -0.352***  
(0.083) (0.235) (0.265) (0.118) 
REG10#  -0.310**  -0.350  -0.468*  -0.266*  
(0.132) (0.324) (0.244) (0.139) 
N2  -0.266**  -0.072  -0.221  -0.402*  
(0.132) (0.322) (0.223) (0.216) 
N3  -0.308***  -0.328  -0.131  -0.335***  
(0.088) (0.359) (0.197) (0.123) 
N4  0.053  -0.416  0.441*  0.050  
(0.118) (0.381) (0.267) (0.169) 
N5  -0.004  0.071  0.239  -0.138  
(0.201) (0.580) (0.366) (0.212) 
N6  -0.074  0.014  -0.139  -0.087  
(0.137) (0.398) (0.314) (0.152) 
N7  -0.225*  -0.006  -0.086  -0.316*  
(0.121) (0.420) (0.306) (0.175) 
N8  -0.590**  -0.575  -0.344  -1.030**  
(0.244) (0.352) (0.295) (0.482) 
N9  -0.304*  -1.345*  0.392  -0.372  
(0.184) (0.688) (0.481) (0.233) 
N10  0.051  0.022  -0.111  0.016  
(0.134) (0.458) (0.330) (0.154) 
N11  -0.067  0.158  -0.159  -0.072  
(0.143) (0.415) (0.284) (0.160) 
N12  -0.227  -0.046  0.191  -0.511**  
(0.174) (0.475) (0.338) (0.241) 
Mills lambda  -0.208  0.571  -1.234  0.137  
(0. 521) (0.898) (0.996) (0.654) 
R2  0.186  0.308  0.209  0.170 
No. of obs.   2,320   356   813   1,151 
Note: #Regions in eastern Germany, including West Berlin. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
(400 replications). *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
